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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS CLARK, et al, : 
Pet it ioner/Appellant, : 
vs. : Case No. 24155 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, et al, : 
Respondents. s 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellant applied to the District Court for a Writ of 
Prohibition claiming that Defendant Circuit Judges were not 
complying with the law and statutes applicable to bail bonding, 
said application was denied and Appellant's action was dismissed 
on procedura1 grounds. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From the order dismissing 
Appellant's complaint, the Appellant takes this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment with instructions 
to the District Court to decide the case on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellants brought this action, invoking the supervisory 
power of the District Court to require the Defendants to comply 
with statutory law and to desist from declaring forfeitures and 
entering j u d g rn e n t s i n d e r o g a t i o n o f S t a t e s t a t u t e s a n d i n 
ci e r o g a t i o n o f t h e C o n s t i t u I i o n o f t h e S t a t e o f U t a h• 
SUMMftRY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The D i st r i ct Cou rt h a s t he power to i s s u e a 11 e xtr a-
ord i nary wr i t s as g rant ed by Hrt i c1e V111, See« 5, Const it ut ion 
0 f U tab. T h e o n 1 y r e rn e ci y a v a i 1 a b 1 e t o t hi e H D p e 11 a n t i s v i a 
extraordinary writ. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make no 
other provision for supervision over Inferior Courts by the 
D i st r i ct Court« 
£. The transcr i pt of t he proceed ings is devoid of any 
mention, by ftp pel I ant or Respondent- of any indispensable party,. 
1 f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s o r a 1 r u 1 i n g :i. rn p 1 i e s t h a t t h e j u d i c i a 1 
c o u n s e 1 rn i g h t b e a n a p p r o p r i a t e t r i b u n a 1. t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n 
i rn p lie s p o w e r s o f t h a t b o d y i n e >< c e s s o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o ri a 1 g r a n t 
u n d e r ft r t i c 1 e V 1 1 1 , S e c: t i o n 12.. a n d t o i rn p I e a d t h e j u d i c i a 1 
c o u n s e 1 wou 1 d be a mean i rtaless gest ure an6 wou 1 d not assist i n 
the d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e i s s u e s -
3. The D i s t r i c t C ou rt s ha ve t he pow e r t o s u per vi s e t h e 
C i r c u it C o u r t s u n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i >:> n o f U t a h, ft r tic I e V 1 1 1 , 
Section 5. 
4 - T h e r e i s n o r e m e d y a v a i I a b 1 e t o ft p p e 11 a n t s t o t h e 
exclusion of the one selected- Appellant contends that the 
Declaratory Judgments Act LiCfl ~7n-~33~l et sea does not give the 
District Court jurisdiction over the Circuit Court, but if such 
jurisdiction does exist, it in r\o way diminishes the District 
Court's supervisory powers via Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of 
Civi1 Procedure. 
5. The act of the Circuit Court, without hearing or notice., 
m suspending Appellants as bondsmen amounted to the taking of a 
valuable property rights without due process. 
6. The Court having jurisdiction over the parties and the 
case being procedurally at issue, the court should have ruled on 
the merits of the contentions of the parties and should have made 
orders disposing of the issues presented. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellant contends on appeal that: 
1. The Honorable District Judge erred m finding that a 
Writ of Prohibition is ari inappropriate remedy under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
i2. The Honorable District Judge erred in determining that 
Appellants had failed to join indispensable parties. 
3. The Honorable District Judne erred in not invoking 
the supervisory powers of the District Court. 
4. The Court erred in holding that the fact that other 
remedies were available to the Appellants precluded the Appel-
lants from invoking the supervisory powers of the District Court-
5- The Honorable District Court Judge erred m not rein-
stating Appellants as bondsmen Qualified to act as sureties 
before the Second Circuit Court. 
6. The Honor a bi e Dist r i c t Ju d ue a r red i n ra f u s ing t o ru1e 
o n the rn e r i t s o f A D D e 11 a n t7 s c o m a 1 a i n t -
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: THE HONORABLE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT 0 WRIT OF PROHIBITION IS AN INAPPROPRIATE REMEDY UNDER 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule £5B (a) provides; 
SPECIAL FORMS OF WRITS ABOLISHED 
Special f o r m s o F D 1 e a d i n g s a n d o f w r i 15 i n h a b e a s 
c o r D U G , rn a n d a rn u s , a u o w a r r a n t o , c e r t i o r a r i, 
D r o h i b i t i o n, a n ri o t h e r e >< t Vs a o r d i n a r y i \> r i t s , a s 
h e r e t o f o r e k n o w n , a r e I") e r a b y a b o 1 i s h e d • N h e r e. n o 
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, 
relief may be obt; a i ned by aoDroor i at a act i on under 
these Rules, on any one of the grourids set forth 
in subdivisions ( b) and ( f) of th is Ru 1 e. 
The Utah Rule 65 apDears to have no parallel provision ir\ 
the Federal Rules, probably because the need, therefore, is 
1a rge1y supplant ed by t he "A11 Ur i t s Act" £8 USCA 1651 (a)« 
Scholarly d i s c u s s ions see a k to t h e ft11 Wr i ts A c t (supra) and 
indicate that while a writ is not an appropriate substitute 
for appeal the use of mandamus is proper to control procedural 
decisions o f trial j u d g e s w hie h a r e ' u r11 i k e 1 y 1" o eve r p r e s e n t 
themselves for r e v i e w i n t hi e t r a d i 11 o n a 1 a p p e a 1 s p r o c e s s» 
Although the-? findings of the trial judge are not a model 
of precision and clarity, the judne rnav we? 11 have concluded that 
the Appellants were ernp 1 ov inn a Wr i i; t o ci rcurnvent t he appea 1 
process- If the court so found, the impact of PEOPLE_ys»_ 
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TREMQYNE, 3 Utah 331, 3P 85, (1884), was not perceived as 
persuasive in the trial judges formulation of his ruling. PEOPLE 
vs. IREMQYNE (supra) appears to be good law for the proposition 
that the bondsman, not being a party to the criminal proceeding, 
said proceeding cannot be made a vehicle by which the bondsman 
may appeal a bail forfeiture order entered upon non-appearance of 
the party Defendant. Although not directly on point, language in 
PEQPLE_ys. DOE_et_aj,, California 342 P£d, 533 (1959), indicates 
that a forfeiture ruling is a civil judgment (supra) at p.535 
(citing cases). Plaintiff does not contend that the holding in 
IBEM9YNE_ys. PEOPLE, (supra) is correct, only that it is the 
law. Plaintiff suggests that that holding might be subject to 
review in light of statutory revisions and in light of the many 
well reasoned cases from other jurisdictions allowing appeals 
from bail forfeiture rulings, see PEDPLE_ys._DPPENHEXMER, 147 Cal 
fipp £d Supp 8£7, 385 P£d 386 (1956). Read as a whole, the Utah 
bonding statutes appear to require that a separate action be 
instituted by the prosecuting attorney in order that a bail 
forfeiture may be reduced to judgment. Perhaps the learned trial 
judge envisioned a separate action authorized under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, but was silent as to the section from 
which the authority would spring. In his first conclusion of 
law, the court concluded: 
1. That the Plaintiffs request for a Writ of Prohibition 
is not an appropriate remedy under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
This conclusion is notwithstanding the holding in 
HILLYBRD__vs^LOGQN_CIIY_ COURT;, Utah, 578 P£d 1270 (1976) and 
WiLLS_vs^_TH^^ Utah, 535 P£d 683 (1975) 
in which cases this court ruled on apnea Is from District Court 
d e c i s i o n s p u r p o r ting t o s u p e r v i s e i n f e r i o r c o u r t s „ 11 m a y b e 
that the court determined that the wrong writ was applied for,, 
that either mandamus or Q U O warranto was appropriate to the 
exclusio n o f D r o h i ID i t i o n. T his c o n t e n t i o n, i f m a d e, see m s a m D 1 y 
answered by the Rule itself, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65B 
(a). 
POINT TWO: THE HONORABLE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED IN DETER-
MINING THAT PLAINTIFF HAD FAILED TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES,, 
W h i 1 e i t i s t r u e t h a t f a i 1 u r e t o j o i n a n i n d .1 s p e n s a b I e p a r t y 
is a defect which war r a n t s d i s m i s s a 1 1 n a c i v i 1 a c t i o n, IJ T A H 
RULES^OF QiyiL^PRQCEDURE 1£(b)(6). one is left to wonder as to 
w h o m the indispensable p a r t y i s - I n C o n c 1 u s x o n o f L a w N o„ £, t h e 
court concludes s 
£. That based on the facts of this case, and in the absence 
of certain indispensable parties. this case is not jus-
ticiable according t «:• t h e U. S,. C o n s t i t u t i o n a s 1 n t e r p r e t e d 
by the United States Supreme Court, 
Even exploring the written and oral findings of this case to 
a point where logic escapes, the only indispensable party 
that can be con j ured up i s t he Jud i c :i. a 1 Counsel- Assurn i ng t hat 
the Judicial Counse 1 i s t h e part y t o wh i ch t he c>:::<urt a 11 udes, t h e 
auest i ons beeorne ; What have t hey done? What powers (jc« t hey 
have? The Judicial Counsel has not addressed bonding problems 
a n d has n o t the p o w e r t o m o d i f y e >< i s t i n g s t a t u t e s, t h e C o u n s e 1 
on 1 y has the po wer t o a ci o o t r u 1 e s f o r t h e a d rn i n i s t r a t i on o f 
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Courts, see 8RIICLE_yjLIIt^Sgc^^Ig^^CQNSIIiyilON^DF^yTfig- I f an 
indispensable party exists, I take it that counsel for respondent 
will enlighten us all. 
POINT THREES THE HONORABLE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED IN NOT 
INVOKING THE SUPERVISORY POWERS OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 
3£ Am Jur £d„ (Federal Practice and Procedure) S 963 
(1981) "...mandamus is proper to control procedural decisions of 
trial judges...". 
Conclusion of Law No. 3 reads: 
3. That the Plaintiff's request for a writ of prohibition 
is not an appropriate remedy under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Perhaps Respondents can suggest a remedy, if any there foe, 
that is appropriate. The Question becomes: if the remedy was 
appropriate in WELLS & HILLYARD (supra), why is it now less 
appropriate? 
POINT FOURs THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FACT THAT 
OTHER REMEDIES WERE AVAILABLE TO THE APPELLANTS PRECLUDED 
THE APPELLANTS FROM INVOKING THE SUPERVISORY POWERS OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT. 
WQLTON^vs^^IHE^CIRCyil^COyRI No. 162B1, SyPjREME^COURI^gF^THE 
STAJE QF UJAH (1979), apparently proceeded as a suit filed 
invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the District Court 
and obtained relief, said judgment being subsequently reviewed by 
this court. The judgment in the Walton case ordered the Circuit 
Court to "exonerate the undertaking in bail and release the 
bondsman from liability"- Walton (supra). The vehicle by which 
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t h e Dower o f t h e D i s t r i c t ' C o u r t o v e r t h e C i r c u i t C o u r t was 
o b t a i n e d i s n o t e v i d e n t f r o m t h e o p i n i o n , b u t i t may w e l l h a v e 
b e e n u n de r \ , t h e D e c 1 a r a t o r y J u d g m e n t s Pi e t , t J C ft 7 3 ~ 3 3 •-• 1 e t s e a , a n ti 
if s u c h was a o r o p e r v e h i c l e , t h a t f a c t i n no way r e q u i r e s t h a t 
t h e e o u r t o v e r r u 1 e t h e N e 1 1 s c a s e a n d t h e !-i :i. ]. I y a r d c a s e., ( s u o r a ) 
T i"i e D e e i a r a f o r y J LI d n m e n t Pi e t i s r e m a r k a b I e i n t h e o m i s s i o ri 
o f any s t a t e m e n t t h a t s u D e r v i s i on o f coi.. irt s o r pLIb I :i. c o f f i c i a 1 s 
i s one o f i t s s t a t e d L ISes . b u t t h e a c t d o e s r e f e r t o t h e d e t e r m i • -
n a t i on o f f he? v a I i d i t y and t he e f f e e t o f s t a t u t e s , bLI t doesn , j t 
d e s i g n a t e who i s t o be t h e p a r t y dvfevitiaYrt,, The p r o b l e m i n t h e 
i n s t a n t c a s e i s t h a t t h e I n f e r i o r C o u r t i s a l i e n e d t o h a v e 
i g r i o r e d p r o c e ci u r a 1 m a n d a t e s s e t f o r t !""i i n s t a t LI t e s» 1 m o 1 i c i f 
j. n t h a t a 1 1 en a t i on i s t he <:::<bservat i on t h a t v~ieed f o r sLI P e r v i s i on 
i s r e a LI i r e a a s o p n o s e ci t o t h e r e n u i r e m e n t f o r s t a t LI t o r y i n1 e r o r e -
t a t i o n o r f o r t h e n e e d f o r j u d i c i a i d e t e r m i n a 11 o n o f s t a t u t o r y 
v a ]. i d i t y . P a r t c> f !::) J. a :i. n t :i. f f • s o r i::« o f w a s 'l; e s t i ivi o n y i:« y t h e 
D e f e rt d a n t C i r c u i t ,T u d G e t r i a t d u e t o i n a c t i v :i. f y o f b h e P r o. s e c u t i n a 
ft11 or r«ey , he kvi<:;:<w:!. nu 1 y ur>.der-1 oc«k t ! ie s t a t L I t c«ry !:::«urde*n r e s e r v e d t o 
t h e P r o s e c L I t i n r i P11 c«rViey (See T r a v i s c r i a t a t !::<age 8 ) .. I f t he 
C i r c u 11 J u ci n e h a d t h a t a u 1; h o r i t y , s o b e 11 „ t h e D i s t r i c t C o LI r t 
c o u l d h a v e v i n d i c a t e d h i m . i f t h e C i r c u i t J u d p e had n o t t h a t 
a u t n ov i i y., i"i e sh c« LI 16 h a v e beer i Pr-o:: i b 11 ed by t h e 1) i s t r i c-1 Co LI r t 
f r o in LI ^ -;> u r p i rj n t h e a LI t hi »a v^  i t y g r a n i: e d I; c« t h e D r o s e c u t o r« W!""! a t 
b e 11 e r v e h i c I e t •::« a e c o rn p 1 :.«. s h 1; I"i a t e y i d 1; hi a n a «w v- 3. f o f !::) r <:- ii i b 11 i «::«vi 
n vN a v"i t e d o r ci e n i e d w i t li a p p r o IJ r i a i; e f :i. n c:i i r\ u s ? 
POINT F I V E : THE HONORABLE DISTRICT COUF?T JUDGE ERRED IN NOT 
9 
REINSTATING APPELLANTS AS BONDSMEN QUALIFIED TO ACT AS SURETIES 
BEFORE THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT. 
It has been held that once granted, the right to bond 
b e e o m e s a p r o p e r t y i n t e r e s t a n d a v a 1 u a b I e t h i v"» g a n d i t rn a y n«::»t 
be take n f r o rn o n e w ;j. t hi o u t d u e p r o c e s S , I J>J JRE C A R T E R^ , 8 5 A p p 
D.C. S£9 177 F£d 75, cert den 338 U.S. 900, 94 L Ed 554, 70 S CT 
£50, (1949). It was held in the Carter case that minimal due 
p r o cess c o u 1 d o n 1 y o b t a i n b y a n evi.de n t i a r y h e a r i n g w h e r e i n e a c h 
party could fairly address the evidence as well as be afforded 
the opportunity to controvert or rebutt the same. In this action 
c o n t e n t i o n s o f A p p e 1 I a n t w e r e p I a c e d s q u a r e I y a t i s s u e a n d 
t h e c o u r t d i d, i n ri o w a y, a d d r e s s t h e s e e o n t e n t i o ri s. A t t h e 
p o i n t i n t i m e a t w h i c h t h i. s b r i e f i s f i 1 e d, t hi e p a r t i e s a\ p p e 1 1 a n t 
s t i 11 rn a y n o t b o n d i n t h e r e s p o n d e n t7 s c o u r t s. 
POINT SIX: THE HONORABLE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO RULE ON THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
I n t h e a c t i o n f o r a W r i t o f P r o h i b i t i o n, t h e A p p e 11a n t 
a f f or d e d t h e e o u r t a n o p p o r t u n i. t y t o w e i t;j h t h e rn e r :i. t s o f e a e hi 
p a r t i e s c o n t e n t i o n s a ri d f i n d i n g t hi e m e r i t s o f A p p e I 1 a n t ' s 
case l a c k i n g - 1 o say s o a n d t c« v i n«: J i c a t e R e s p o n d e n t s . T h i s t h e 
c c« u r t d i d n o t d o, d e c 1 i n i n g o n p v^  o c e d u r a I g r o u n d E> g e^  n e r a 11 y , b u t 
o f f e r i n g l i t 11 e d i. r e c t .i o n t o t h e 1 i t i g a n t s , a p p a r e n 11 y 1 e a v i n g 
t h a t b u r ci e n c« f c:! i r e c t i o r i t o t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f U t a hi. 
CONCLUSION 
A11 a u t hi c:« r i t i e s c i t e d fa y A p p e 1 1 a n t s s e e rn t o s u p p o r t t h e 
10 
not i on t h at a W r i t o f pr •::• h i fo i t i o n i s an a p pro pr i a t e veh i c1 e t o 
s u p e r v i s e i n f e r i o r c o u r t s -
Tr a d i t i onally Ut ah D i st r i ct Courts have hiearcl pet i t i onB 
f or Wr i t s of Proh i ta i t i on ancl have d i sp«::• sed of t hem on the mer i t s 
a n d i n s o d o i n r:j h a v e o f f e r e cl g u i c:l a n c e t o a n cl h a v e i m p o s e d 
restraints on inferior courts, 
To deprive Bondsmen «::• f a property interest ancJ to impose 
1 i a b i 1 i t y w i t h o u t a n y h e a r i n g i s v i o 1 a t i v e o f ci u e p roe e s s 
restri c t ions irnposed on the State by its Gonst itut ion-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST-JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS CLARK, ET AL., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs< 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF 
UTAH, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 24155 
THIS MATTER, having come for hearing on the 30th day of August, 
1985, was heard before the Honorable John Wahlquist, without a jury, in the 
First District Court of Logan, Utah. The plaintiffs, through A.W. Lauritzen, 
their attorney; and the Defendants, through Michael D. Smith, their attorney, 
presented certain testimony by witnesses who were properly sworn. Having 
considered said testimony, exhibits presented, having received arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, thi5 Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the plaintiffs are bail bondsmen who, prior to the 
initiation of this action, were qualified to post bonds in the Second Circuit 
Court, State of Utah. 
2. That the defendants, Judge Ted S. Perry and Judge David W. 
Sorenson, preside as Circuit Court Judges in the Second Circuit Court, State 
of Utah. 
3. That pursuant to Utah statutes (UCA 77-20-7(2)) the defendant, 
Judge Ted S. Perry, in his capacity as Circuit Court Judge did order the 
forfeiture of bonds posted by plaintiffs in behalf of certain criminal 
defendants. 
4. That the forfeiture of said bonds resulted in the failure of 
said criminal defendants to appear or to make themselves subject to the Second 
Circuit Court's jurisdiction for the purpose of executing sentences imposed by 
said Court. 
5. That the defendant, Judge David W. Sorenson, did restrict the 
plaintiffs from writing bonds in the Second Circuit Court, State of Utah, 
until the case filed by plaintiffs against the defendants was resolved. 
6. That the defendant, Judge David W. Sorenson, restricted the 
plaintiffs from writing said bonds in order to avoid what said defendant 
perceived as a conflict of interest. 
7. That none of the criminal defendants that failed to appear in 
the cases before the Second Circuit Court are before this Court. 
8. That in each criminal case presented by the plaintiffs, the 
defendant either failed to appear for arraignment or failed to comply with the 
provisions of the sentence as imposed by the Circuit Court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiff's request for a writ of prohibition is not an 
appropriate remedy under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. That based on the facts of this case, and in the absence of 
certain indispensable parties, this case is not justiciable according to the 
U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. 
3. That this Court should not exercise supervisory power in the 
manner requested by plaintiffs oyer the defendants in their capacities as 
Circuit Court Judges. 
4. That the plaintiffs in this matter have adequate remedies at law 
which obviate the need for this Court's interference in the operation of the 
workings of the Second District Court of the State of Utah. 




Michael D. Smith 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the President 
Utah State University 
Logan, Utah 84322 
(801) 750-1162 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 'DTSTRICT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS CLARK, ET AL., * 
Plaintiffs, * ORDER 
vs. * 
'.:«;< 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF 
UTAH, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 24155 
THIS MATTER, having come before this Court on August 30, 1985, for 
hearing, and the Court having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusionsof Law now enters its final Order as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs request for a Writ of Prohibition is denied and this 
matter is dismissed. ~, 
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78-33-1 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-33-9. Trial of issues of fact. 
78-33-10. Costs. 
78-33-11. Part ios. 
78-33-12. Chapter to be liberally construed. 
78-33-13. "Person" defined. 
78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts—Form—Effect.—The district 
courts within their respective jurisdictions sliall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is 
or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection 
on flic ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The 
declaration may be cither affirmative or negative in form and effect; and 
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or 
decree. 
History: L. 1951, cli. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 101-33-1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-64-1 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Jurisdictions tha t have adopted the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgments Act include: 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virgin Islands, 
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wis-
consin, and Wyoming. 
Cross-Reference. 
Submitting controversy without action, 
78-11-11. 
Construction and application. 
The Declaratory Judgments Act (78-
33-1 to 78-33-13) is not designed for giving 
advisory opinions in a nonadversary ac-
tion, or to insure against feared risk. 
Packman v. Salt Lake Countv, 13 U. (2d) 
412, 375 P . 2d 756. 
Effect of dismissal. 
Dismissal of teacher's suit for declara-
tory judgment determining status under 
Teachers' Retirement Act for lark of juris-
diction was not res judicata barr ing sub-
sequent mandamus proceeding for same 
purpose. Gibson v. Utah State Teachers' 
Retirement Bd., 99 U. 576, 105 P. 2d 353, 
reh. den. 99 U. 592, 110 P. 2d 365, apply-
ing former 104-64-1. 
Exclusivcncss of remedy. 
Declaratory judgment is not confined 
to cases where no other relief was or 
could be granted. The language of former 
101-61-1 indicated that it could be granted 
ns alternative or as additional relief. Grav 
v. Defa, 103 IT. 339, 135 P. 2d 251, followed 
in Whitmore v. Murray Citv, 107 Lr. 445, 
151 P. 2d 748. 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
Where plaintiff sought declaratory judg-
ment as to the nature of the legal rela-
tionship between the No-Fault Insurance 
Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
and no facts were required to be pleaded 
or proved, there was no need to exhaust 
administrative remedies prior to .seeking a 
declaratory judgment. IML Freight v. 
Ottosen, 538 P. 2d 296. 
Extent of relief tha t may be granted. 
Draftsmen of Uniform Act contemplated 
the broadest methods of requesting decla-
rations, both as incidental to actions or 
proceedings seeking coercive judgment and 
in independent proceedings in which 
nothing but a declaration is sought. This 
appears more clearly from the clause 
"whether or not further relief is or could 
be claimed." In other words, trial court 
may settle the entire controversy, and 
enter both declaratory and coercive de-
crees. Gray v. D e f a / l 0 3 TJ. 339, 135 P. 
2d 251, followed in Whitmore v. Murray 
City, 107 IT. 445, 154 P. 2d 74 8. 
Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes 
courts to grant doclaiatoiy relief in con-
junction with usual legal judgments 
and/or equitable coercive decrees. Also, 
declaratory relief may bo given in a 
separate proceeding wheic nothing but 
declaratory relief is sought. Admittedly, 
most controversies can be settled by the 
entry of a regular legal or equitable judg-
ment. Tn such cases, there is no need for 
declaratory lelief. However, wlieie the 
need does exist and the en h y of a 
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declaratory decree will serve a useful pur-
pose in ending the uncertainty giving rise 
to the proceeding, there is no practical or 
legal justification for requiring separate 
actions to obtain the separate forms of 
relief. Gray v. Defa, 303 U. 339, 135 
P. 2d 251, followed in Whitmore v. Murray 
City, 107 U. 445, 154 P, 2d 7-18. 
Joinder of actions. 
In action by purchaser of land from 
county, which it had acquired because 
of delinquent taxes, against defendants 
claiming interest in land, independent 
parallel suit to make decision of original 
suit applicable to all lands in drainage 
districts which were designated defend-
ants in parallel suit could not be joined, 
since controversies cannot be joined in 
parallel, and contention that this act al-
lows such joinder was held without merit, 
since this act does not dispense with 
necessity of a subject in respect to which 
judgment can operate. Millard County v. 
Millard County Drainage Dist. No. J, 80 
U. 475, 4G P. 2d 423, applying Laws 1925, 
ch. 24, § 1. 
Proper subjects for declaratory relief. 
Former 104-04-1 did not afford such an 
adequate remedy to test validity of statute 
providing formula for determining amount 
of tax exemption as to preclude state tax 
commission from bringing writ of prohibi-
tion to try that question. Washington 
County v. State Tax Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 
P. 2d 5G4. 
Action to determine priority of water 
rights was justiciable even though plain-
tiff could later lose his rights if he failed to 
complete his works and put them to bene-
ficial use. Whitmore v. Murray City, 107 
U. 445, 154 P. 2d 748. 
Action might be brought under former 
304-Gi-l to determine right of tax com-
mission to tax property, and although 
all of the plaintiffs had separate causes 
of action, they might join in one action 
to avoid a multiplicity of suits, where ques-
tions involved and relief asked were the 
same in each instance. Crystal Car Lino v. 
State Tax Comm., 110 'U. 42G, 174 P . 
2d 984. 
Declaratory Judgment Act may be in-
voked to test constitutionality of city 
ordinance. Phi Kappa Iota Fraterni ty v. 
Salt Lake City, 116 U. 53G, 212 P. 2d 177. 
Quieting t i t le. 
Where plaintiff seeks to obtain a decree 
quieting title to certain lands, which 
action is in the nature of a declaratory 
proceeding, the action is in effect an 
action to quiet title, although plaintiff 
seeks relief under Dcclaratoiy Judgment 
Act. Gray v. Defa, 103 U. 339, 135 P. 2d 
251. 
Collateral References. 
Declaratory Juclgmcnt@=>5, 273. 
2G C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 5 et 
seq. 
22 Am. Jur. 2d 839, Declaratory Judg-
ments § 4. 
Actions under Declaratory Judgment 
Act as subject to limitations or .conditions 
of jurisdiction imposed by other statutes, 
119* A. L. R. 1103. 
Application of Declaratory Judgment 
Acts to questions in respect of contracts 
or alleged contracts, 3G2 A. L. R. 75G. 
Application of Declaratory Judgment 
Acts to questions in respect of insurance 
policies, 142 A. L. R. 8. 
lUmlen of proof in actions under gen-
eral declaratory judgment acts, 23 A. L. B. 
2d 1213. 
Declaration of rights or declaratory 
judgments, 87 A. L. J\. 1205. 
Doctrine of in pari delicto as applicable 
to suits for declaratory relief, 141 A. L. R. 
] 127. 
Extent to which principles of res judi-
cata are applicable to judgments in actions 
for declaratory relief, 10 A. L. R. 2d 782. 
Joinder of causes of action and parties 
in suit under Declaratory Judgment Act, 
110 A. L. R. S17. 
Judicial relief other than by dissolution 
or receivership in cases of intracorporate 
deadlock, 47 A. L. R. 2d 3G5. 
Jurisdictional amount in its relation to 
suit for declaratory judgment, 115 A. L. 
R. M89. 
Jurisdiction of declaratory action as 
affected by pendency of another action or 
proceeding, 135 A. L. R. 934. 
May declaratory and coercive or execu-
tory relief be combined in action under 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 155 A. L. 11. 
501. 
Negligence issue as a proper subject for 
declaratory judgment action, 28 A. L. R. 
2d 957. 
Partnership or joint venture matters, 32 
A. L. R. 2d 970. 
Questions regarding rights of inheritance 
or other rights in respect of another's 
estate after death as proper subject of 
declaratory action before latter 's death, 
139 A. L. R. 1239. 
Relief against covenant restricting right 
to engage in business or profession, as 
subject of declaratory judgment, 10 A. L. 
R. 2d 743. 
Remedy or procedure to make effective 
rights \stablished by declaratory judg-
ment, L»l A. L. R. GS9. 
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Right to declaratory relief as affected 
by existence of other remedy, 172 A. L. R. 
847. 
Suspension or expulsion f?om church 
or religious society and the remedies there-
for, 20 A. L. R. 2d 421. 
Suspension or expulsion from piofes-
sional association and the remedies there-
for, 20 A. L. R. 2d 531. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Snpp., 104-33-2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical to former sec-
tion 104-64-2 (Code 1943) which was 
repealed by Laws 195], ch. 58, § 3 . 
Challenging penal s tatute . 
Persons seeking sterilization are not re-
quired to risk prosecution but could have 
declaratory judgment as to whether such 
voluntary sterilization would be a felony 
under 64-10-12. Parker v. Ramplon, 28 U. 
(2d) 36, 497 P. 2d 848. 
Divorco decree. 
"Declaratory judgment purporting to in-
terpret or modify decree of divorce wns 
nullity since divorce decree is not n proper 
subject for declaratory -judgment. Crofts 
v. Crofts, 21 U. (2d) 332,'445 P. 2d 701. 
Issues of fact. 
Portion of statute providing that any 
person interested under writ ten contract 
may have any question of construction or 
validity arising under instrument deter-
mined by the court is governed by 7S-33-9 
providing where issue of fact is involved, 
it is triable as in other cases. Oil Shale 
Corp. v. Larson, 20 U. (2d) 369, '138 P. 2d 
540. 
Operation and effect of section. 
Former 104-64-2 did not afford such an 
adequate remedy to test the constitution-
ality of statute providing formula for de-
termining amount of tax exemption as to 
preclude the state tax commission from 
bringing writ of prohibition to test its 
validity. Washington County v. State Tax 
Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 P. 2d 561. 
Suspension or expulsion from social club 
or similar society and the remedies there-
for, 20 A. L. R. 2d 344. 
Title or right to office in unincorporated 
private association, 82 A. L. R. 2d 1172. 
Validity or existence of common-law 
marriage, 92 A. L. R. 2d 1102. 
Standing to bring action. 
A party maintaining an action under 
this act must have a substantial interest or 
legally protcctible interest in the subject 
matter of the litigation. Main Parking 
Mall v. Salt Lake City Corp., 531 P. 2d 
866. 
Collateral References. 
Declaratory ,Tudgment<£=>81 et scq. 
26 C.J.S. 'Declaratory Judgments §31 
et scq. 
22 Am. Jur . 2d 870, Declaratory Judg-
ments § 25 et scq. 
Action under declaratory judgment act 
to test validity or effect of a decree of 
divorce, 124 A.*L. R. 1336. 
"Actual controversy" under declaratory 
judgment statute in zoning and building 
rcshiction cases, 174 A. L. R. 853. 
Availability and scope of declaratory 
judgment actions in determining rights of 
parties, or powers and exercise thereof by 
arbitrators, under arbitration agreements, 
3 2 A. L. R. 3d 851. 
Breach of lessor's covenant against use 
of his other property in competition with 
lessee-covenantec, 97 A. L. R. 2d 119. 
Custody of child as proper subject of 
declaratory action, 170 A. L. R. 521. 
Declaratory judgment, during lifetime 
of spouses, as to construction of antenup-
tial agreement dealing with property l ights 
of survivor, 80 A. L. R. 2d 941. 
Declaratory judgments in matters af-
fecting municipalities, 87 A. L. R. 1232. 
Declaratory ielief with respect to un-
employment compensation, 14 A. L. R. 2d 
826. 
Determination of constitutionality of 
statute or ordinance, or proposed statute 
or ordinance, as proper subject of judicial 
decision under declaratory judgment acts, 
111 A. L. R. 1361. 
78-33-2. Rights, status, legal relations under instruments or statute 
may be determined.—Any person interested under a deed, will or written 
contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by 
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined 
any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, 
statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, 
status or other legal relations thereunder. 
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